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ARE PEOPLE IN FEDERAL TERRITORIES PART OF “WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES”?
Gary Lawson*
Guy Seidman**
Forthcoming 9 TEX. A & M L. REV. – (2022)
Abstract
In 1820, a unanimous Supreme Court proclaimed: “The United States is the name given to
our great republic, which is composed of states and territories.” While that key point is simple,
and perhaps even obvious, the constitutional implications of such a construction of “the United
States” as including federal territories are potentially far reaching. In particular, the
Constitution’s Preamble announces that the Constitution is authored by “We the People of the
United States” and that the document is designed to “secure the Blessings of Liberty” to the author
and its “Posterity.” If inhabitants of federal territory are among “We the People of the United
States,” then federal actors owe them (and their “Posterity”) the same fiduciary duties owed to
people in the States. There is no definitive answer as a matter of original meaning as to the scope
of “We the People of the United States,” but the presumptive meaning of “the United States” in
1788 included federal territory, so the presumptive meaning of “the People of the United States”
would similarly include people in federal territory. While there are strong textual and contextual
arguments for excluding territorial inhabitants from “We the People,” there are also
countervailing textual and contextual arguments for their inclusion. In the end, the answer may
depend on something beyond the reach of interpretative theory: How strong is the presumption in
favor of inclusion that can be drawn from pre-1788 understandings and practices? If territorial
inhabitants are indeed among “We the People of the United States,” then federal action towards
the territories must conform to fiduciary norms, including the key norm of impartiality with respect
to multiple beneficiaries, which would require very strong reasons for disfavoring territorial
inhabitants in comparison to state inhabitants.
In Loughborough v. Blake 1 in 1820, a unanimous Supreme Court proclaimed: “The United
States is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of states and territories. The
district of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri [River], is not less within the United
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1

18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
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States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania.” 2 At the time of this statement, the Court could not
realistically look beyond the continental United States, or even beyond the Rocky Mountains; the
“territory west of the Missouri” ended with the extent of the Louisiana Purchase. 3 Turning
southward, the United States was well on its way to acquiring Florida from Spain, 4 but in 1820
that was the extent of the nation’s expansion from the original boundaries confirmed by the Treaty
of Paris in 1783. 5 The United States had not yet become an overseas empire with island
possessions in two oceans.
On its face, however, the Supreme Court’s unqualified statement in Loughborough would
seem to apply equally to federally acquired territory southeast of the Caloosahatchee River, such
as Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, or far southwest of the Colorado River, such as American
Samoa. The Constitution speaks only of “Territory . . . belonging to the United States,” 6 without
distinctions based on geography, culture, or time. If the Supreme Court’s broad language was
right in 1820, the term “the United States” includes not only States but also federally controlled
territories, whatever their location.

2

Id. at 318-19. The Court anticipated these remarks fifteen years earlier. While holding that residents of the District
of Columbia were not, as a matter of statutory interpretation, state citizens for diversity purposes, the Court thought it
clear that District residents were “citizens of the United States.” Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445,
453 (1805). The same would presumably be true of residents of other federal territory at the time.

3

See Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, Apr. 30, 1803, art. I, 8 Stat. 200, 202.
The precise extent of the Louisiana Purchase was not entirely clear in 1803. See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN,
THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 20, 87-89 (2004). At a
minimum, it included all or part of the present States of Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
4

See Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits Between the United States of America and His Catholic Majesty, the
King of Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, United States-Spain, art. II, 8 Stat. 252. Spain did not ratify the treaty until October 5,
1820, and the treaty was not effectuated until early 1821. See WILLIAM EARL WEEKS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND
AMERICAN GLOBAL EMPIRE 168-73 (1992). But as a practical matter at least parts of Florida had been part of the
United States even before the treaty formalized the acquisition. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 89-90.
5

Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.

6

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

2
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While that key point is simple, and perhaps even obvious, the constitutional implications
of such a construction of “the United States” are potentially far reaching. Just to name a few
implications: If “the United States” to which the Supreme Court was referring in 1820 was the
same “United States” that appears as a term fifty-three times in the Constitution of 1788 (and again
in the Fourteenth Amendment of 1868), all federal duties, imposts, and excises would need to be
uniform across both States and territories 7 – meaning that there could never be an export tax on
territorial goods, because there can be no export taxes on state goods 8 and the only permissible
“uniform” rate on national exports is therefore zero. More fundamentally, persons born in
territories would appear to be United States citizens, entitled to all of the rights and subject to all
of the duties thereof, at least as of 1868 by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment 9 if not by virtue
of the Constitution of 1788 itself. And, most importantly, if “the United States” includes territories
as well as States, then people in territories would be among the “People of the United States” who
ordained and established the Constitution. 10 Arguably, then, subsequent territorial inhabitants
would be among the “Posterity” 11 of the Constitution’s author and would thus be among those for
whom the “Blessings of Liberty” are to be secured.
Present-day doctrine reflects none of these understandings.

Eighty years after

Loughborough, a divided Supreme Court held that duties on exports from Puerto Rico were

7

See id.. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States”).

8

See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”).

9

See id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States”).

10

See U.S. CONST. Preamble (“We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America.).

11

Id. (‘in Order to . . . secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”).

3
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constitutionally permissible, 12 meaning that Puerto Rico is not considered part of “the United
States” for purposes of the uniformity provision of the Taxing Clause. Citizenship for territorial
inhabitants has long been handled by treaty and statute rather than constitutional command, though
the question whether territorially born inhabitants are automatically citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment is currently being litigated -- and was resolved in favor of constitutionally based
citizenship by one district court, only to have that decision overturned by a divided vote in the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 13 For more than a century, the extension to territorial inhabitants
of certain basic rights of citizens, such as rights to trial by jury and indictment by grand jury, has
been held to be a matter of congressional choice rather than constitutional requirement for at least
some territorial inhabitants. 14 With respect to fiduciary duties, there is presently no general
recognition of those duties for federal actors, in or out of the territories, though we have written
extensively on why that omission seriously misreads the Constitution, which imposes fiduciary
duties on all actors empowered by it. 15 But even if one accepts our conclusion that federal officials

12

See Downes v. Bidwell, 184 U.S. 244 (1901).

13
See Fitisemanu v. United States, 426 F.Supp.3d 1155 (D. Utah 2019); rev’d, Fitisemanu v. United States, 2021
WL 2431586 (10th Cir. 2021).
14

See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (no right to indictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury in Hawaii);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (no right to jury trial in the Philippines); Ocampo v. United States, 234
U.S. 91 (I1914) (no right to indictment by grand jury in the Philippines); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)
(no right to jury trial in Puerto Rico). If the territory is deemed “incorporated” into the United States – meaning
roughly that the territory is a serious candidate for statehood, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008) –
then all rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution apply to it without regard to congressional action. See Rasmussen
v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905). For unincorporated territories, only “fundamental” rights apply of their own
force. Those “fundamental” rights, under current doctrine, do not include all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
regarding criminal procedure or all of the Constitution’s structural or separation of powers provisions. For a brief (but
we think telling) critique of this distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories, see LAWSON &
SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 196-97. For a slightly longer (and we think equally telling) critique, see Gary Lawson &
Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status
Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1176-78 (2009).
15

See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY
CONSTITUTION (2017); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, An Enquiry Concerning Constitutional Understanding, 17
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491 (2019); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and
the Federal Government’s Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1385 (2018); Gary Lawson, Robert G. Natelson

4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3932611

are fiduciaries, the idea that territorial inhabitants are part of “the People of the United States” to
whom those fiduciary duties run flies in the face of virtually all of United States history.
This article focuses on a portion of the last – and we think most basic – of the foregoing
potential implications from treating territories as part of “the United States” for purposes of the
Constitution. We explore whether, as a matter of original constitutional meaning, territorial
inhabitants are part of “We the People of the United States” as that term is used in the Preamble.
This is not an easy interpretative question to resolve – or even to analyze. It is well known
that the concept of United States citizenship was not sharply defined at the time of the founding.16
The Constitution did not contain even a partial definition of national citizenship until 1868, and
the only specific references to the concept in the original Constitution are a grant of power to
Congress to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” 17 and cryptic provisos that the President
must be “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of
this Constitution,” 18 that members of the House of Representatives be “seven Years a Citizen of
the United States,” 19 and that senators be “nine Years a Citizen of the United States.” 20 It is not
obvious what was meant by “a Citizen of the United States” in these clauses. Even three quarters
of a century after the Constitution was ratified, Attorney General Edward Bates, in famously

& Guy Seidman, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014). Our position
is not idiosyncratic. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Andrew Kent, Fiduciary Law and the Law of Public Office, 62 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1297 (2021); Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications
for Self-Pardons and Non-Delegation, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 463 (2019).
16

See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 10, 209 (1978); Michael
D. Ramsey, Originalism and Birthright Citizenship, 109 GEO. L.J. 405, 410-11 (2020).
17

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

18

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.

19

Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.

20

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.

5
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refusing to extend the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Dred Scott 21 that even free blacks could
not be citizens of a State for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, could write:
Who is a citizen? What constitutes a citizen of the United States? I have
often been pained by the fruitless search in our law books and the records of our
courts, for a clear and satisfactory definition of the phrase citizen of the United
States. I find no such definition, no authoritative establishment of the meaning of
the phrase, neither by a course of judicial decisions in our courts, nor by the
continued and consentaneous action of the different branches of our political
government. For aught I see to the contrary, the subject is now as little understood
in its details and elements, and the question as open to argument and to speculative
criticism, as it was at the beginning of the Government. 22
The arguably broader concept of “We the People of the United States” was even more shadowy.
In prior work, we deliberately avoided trying to ascertain the identity of “We the People of
the United States” who “ordained and established” the Constitution:
Who composed the entity “We the People” (never mind its posterity) in 1788? Was
it just the people who actually ratified the document? Who actually participated in
the ratification process?

Who were eligible to participate in the ratification

process? Who chose to honor the ratification process by failing to engage in armed
rebellion? Who were subject to the jurisdiction of the institutions created by the
document whether or not he or she had any role in the document’s ratification?
. . . Even to begin to sort through these complexities involving eighteenth-century

21

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

22

10 Opp. Att’y Gen. 382, 383 (1862).

6
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understandings of citizenship, allegiance, obligation, and claims of right would
require at least a book . . . . 23
To give away the ending of this article: We are no more confident now than we were four years
ago that we have definitive answers to these questions. But if we are right that the Constitution is
best understood as some form of fiduciary instrument designed by and for the benefit of “We the
People of the United States,” those questions are key to understanding some crucial features of the
Constitution, including the status of the territories and territorial inhabitants and the responsibilities
of federal actors towards them. Thus, we are at least going to give those questions a look.
Part I frames the issue of authorship of the Constitution, which is crucial to understanding
the role of territorial inhabitants in the constitutional scheme. Authorship matters because the
Preamble declares that the Constitution is designed to benefit “ourselves [meaning We the People
of the United States] and our Posterity.” Whoever counts among “We the People of the United
States” thus determines who the Constitution regards as its beneficiaries. The Constitution’s legal
author was “We the People of the United States,” regardless of who literally wrote or ratified the
words contained in that document. Thus, one cannot ascertain whether territorial inhabitants are
part of “We the People” simply by noting that they had no role in the ratification process and no
constitutional representation in Congress. The content of “We the People of the United States”
could be co-extensive with the “the ratifiers of the Constitution” or any other sub-group of the (in
1788) continental population, but nothing in the Constitution mandates that conclusion.
Part II discusses the status of federal territory and its inhabitants before ratification of the
Constitution in 1788 in order to help ascertain the original meaning of the term “We the People of

23

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 14, at 145-46. See also Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary
Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1162 (2014) (posing similar questions about the character of federal
fiduciary obligations).

7
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the United States” at that time. The key proposition is that the presumptive meaning of “the United
States” in 1788 was precisely the meaning attributed to that phrase by Chief Justice John Marshall
in Loughborough.

And if “the United States” presumptively includes federal territory, “the

People of the United States” presumptively includes people in federal territory.
In light of that pre-constitutional territorial status, Part III examines the strongest arguments
for and against considering territorial inhabitants to be part of “We the People of the United States”
at the time of the framing. Suffice it to say that there are good arguments for both positions. The
answer may depend on something beyond the capacity of interpretative theory to determine: Who
bears the burden of proof regarding the inclusion of territorial inhabitants in “We the People of the
United States” and how strong is that burden?
Part IV briefly sketches some of the consequences of considering territorial inhabitants to
be part of the “We the People,” on the assumption (which we defend at great length elsewhere)
that the Constitution takes the form of some kind of fiduciary instrument. A full treatment of those
consequences is the stuff of a separate article or book, but we think it can be established that the
basic fiduciary duties of federal actors extend to people in the territories as well as people in the
States.
This article is an exploration of original meaning, which requires at least three up-front
clarifications about the nature of the project. First, we are focused only on defining “We the People
of the United States” as of 1788 when the Constitution first took effect. There have been other
periods when the meaning of “We the People” took center stage in United States legal and political
history. The meaning of “We the People” was the key issue on the eve of the Civil War in Dred
Scott, in which the plurality opinion maintained that no American Blacks – even free Blacks with
full state citizenship – could ever be citizens of any State in the United States for purposes of

8
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federal diversity jurisdiction. Half a century later, as we have also already noted, the Court, in the
face of national expansion across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, abandoned the dictum of
Loughborough v. Blake regarding the inclusive character of “the United States”; the meaning of
“the United States” and its “People” was the dominant constitutional question of that moment.
This article addresses neither of those episodes (though we have briefly addressed them
elsewhere 24) but concentrates solely on ascertaining the original meaning of “We the People of the
United States” in the Preamble to the Constitution of 1788.
Second, we emphasize that our understanding of “original meaning” is different, and in
important respects narrower, than is commonplace in inquiries that generally proceed under the
label “originalism.” We mean only to ascertain the original communicative content of the
Constitution. We do not mean to prescribe that content as the basis for judicial or other decisions.
Indeed, we do not argue here (or elsewhere) that the Constitution’s communicative meaning should
(or should not) contribute in any fashion to the content of constitutional decision-making. 25 Those

24

On Dred Scott, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Teacher’s Manual to The U.S. Constitution: Creation,
Reconstruction, the Progressives, and the Modern Era 188 (2020). On the debates at the turn of the nineteenth century,
culminating in the Insular Tariff Cases, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 15, at 194-97. For trenchant analyses of
competing conceptions of “the United States” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Christina Duffy
Burnett, “They Say I Am Not an American . . . “: The Noncitizen National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA.
J. INT’L L. 659 (2008); Christina Duffy Burnett, The Constitution and Deconstitution of the United States, in THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1803-1898, at 181 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew H. Sparrow
eds., 2005).
25

We thus disagree with Larry Solum that contribution to legal meaning – what Professor Solum calls the “constraint
thesis” Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (“the original meaning of the constitutional text should constrain constitutional practice”) -- is one
of the “core ideas of originalist constitutional theory.” Id. To be sure, Professor Solum’s claim about the core ideas
of originalism is generally descriptively accurate across the broad range of originalist theory, most of which is
prescriptive as well as descriptive, but it does not describe our concededly idiosyncratic approach or this particular
project. For more on the crucial, and too often overlooked, distinction between originalism as a tool for ascertaining
textual meaning and as a prescriptive norm for governance see Lawson & Seidman, An Enquiry Concerning
Constitutional Understanding, supra note 15, at 494-95; Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, 93 B.U. L.
REV. 1309 (2013).

9
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are important prescriptions and arguments, to be sure, and others are free to offer, defend, or
critique them, but we do not offer, defend, or critique them here. Our project is purely descriptive.
Third, with respect to that descriptive focus: By “original communicative content of the
Constitution,” we mean the things and relations in the world to which the concepts in the
Constitution refer. The criteria for inclusion of things and relations in those concepts are
determined by the hypothetical conceptual framework of a hypothetical author of the document in
1788 (hence the “originalist” part of this project) rather than by the real-world thoughts or
frameworks of concrete historical individuals, whether past or present. 26 In practice, this search
for hypothetical authorial intention in the context of an externally directed legal document such as
the Constitution requires reference to the conceptual framework of a hypothetical reasonable
reader. Accordingly, we are less interested than some other theorists might be in what actual
historical figures thought or said about the Constitution. Those real-world thoughts and words are
potentially relevant for ascertaining the meaning ascribed to the Constitution by a hypothetical
actor, but they are not determinative or constitutive of that meaning. We will not here get into the
weeds of this methodology. 27 We say as much as we have only because our approach differs
enough from what generally goes by the name of “originalism” so that our use of the term
“originalism” without explanation might lead to misunderstanding. Indeed, it is not clear that the
term “originalism” is even the best description of our methodology. As one of us has written:

26

See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47 (2006). As it
happens, reference to real-world thoughts and beliefs yields the same uncertainties that we wrestle with using our
hypothetical-author methods. The founding generation was no more settled on what constitutes “the United States”
than were the imperial and anti-imperial theorists a century after the founding. See Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Northwest Ordinance, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1652 (2019) (describing “multiple
meanings of ‘United States’ in the late eighteenth century. Sometimes, the term referred specifically and only to the
thirteen states collectively; in other instances, it described the entire territory of the nation of the United States”).
27

For an outline of it, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 15, at 8-11; Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical
Reader (Or, Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016).

10
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[W]hen I am supposedly standing shoulder to shoulder as an “originalist” with,
inter alia, Bruce Ackerman, Larry Alexander, Sam Alito, Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin,
Randy Barnett, Will Baude, Raoul Berger, and Robert Bork – and those are just the
“As” and “Bs” that leap immediately to mind who are swept in by some currently
circulating broad definitions of originalism – it is not clear that the label
“originalist” is doing a lot of useful epistemological work. 28
Perhaps we should just say that we are engaged in the empirical project of ascertaining the
communicative meaning of the phrase “We the People of the United States” in the Constitution of
1788 and leave it at that.

I

For whose benefit are federal actors – Congress, the President, and the federal courts 29 –
supposed to govern? The Constitution answers that question, albeit in ambiguous fashion, in its
very first sentence.
The Constitution’s Preamble reads in full:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and

28

Id. at 1458.

29

Technically, members of the electoral college are also federal actors. One could say the same of state officials
performing functions created by the federal Constitution, such as setting state rules for federal elections, and grand
and petit jurors in federal proceedings. One might even say it of voters in federal elections. But we focus in this
article on Congress, since it is the primary actor with regard to governance of federal territory.

11
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our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America. 30
The Preamble does not play much of a role in modern constitutional discourse or law. 31 Nor did it
play much of a role in the founding era; James Wilson “is the only one of the Founders to treat the
Preamble as a statement of the principles underlying the Constitution.” 32 We do not here enter
into debates concerning whether or how the Preamble does or should affect the scope of other
constitutional provisions.33 Our focus on the Preamble has a more specific purpose: It tells us the
legal author of the Constitution, which in turn tells us who the Constitution was designed to benefit.
The legal author of the Constitution is “We the People of the United States,” and the document is
designed to benefit that author and its “Posterity.”
Of course, the Constitution was not in fact written by anything or anyone that can plausibly
be characterized as “We the People of the United States.” If taken literally, the Preamble’s
assertion of authorship is factually false, an absurd pretension, or both. For interpretative purposes,
however, two points must be kept in mind.
First, as far as meaning rather than legitimacy is concerned, it does not matter how false or
absurd a pretension the document’s announcement of authorship might be. To the extent that

30

U.S. CONST. Preamble.

31
See John W. Welch & James A. Heilpern, Recovering Our Forgotten Preamble, 91 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1024
(2018) (“The Preamble is rarely mentioned in federal court opinions, in constitutional law treatises, or in leading law
school constitutional textbooks.”). For a notable exception to the absence of the Preamble from casebooks, see
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & GARY LAWSON, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: CREATION, RECONSTRUCTION, THE
PROGRESSIVES, AND THE MODERN ERA 115-42 (2020).
32

William Ewald, James Wilson and the American Founding, 17 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 21 (2019). But see
Welch & Heilpern, supra note 31, at 1050-61 (taking a more optimistic view of the Preamble’s significance at the
founding).

33

See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST
ORIGINALISMS 62 (2015 (“we should aspire to fidelity to our scheme as an ongoing frame of government pursuing the
ends of the Preamble”).

12
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authorship is relevant to the ascertainment of meaning, the document’s claim of authorship is
conclusive. 34
Second, legal documents often have literal authors and legal authors, and the two can be
very different. Wills are almost never literally written by the decedents whose affairs they settle;
they are written by lawyers. But, legally speaking, the will is considered to be the instrument of
the decedent. If one is looking for the “intention” behind the instrument, it is the intention of the
decedent, not of the lawyer who actually wrote the words. This is true even if the decedent never
read the will but just signed on the dotted line where the lawyer pointed. Similarly, if one
downloads a form document such as a lease and then signs it, the unknown person or persons who
literally wrote the form document are legally irrelevant; the document is legally considered to be
the product of the person who adopts and uses it, whether or not that person actually composed (or
even read) the words. 35
The literal authors of the Constitution, including the Preamble, were some combination of
persons at the Constitutional Convention. Probably the best candidates for literal authors of most
of the words of the document are the five members of the Committee of Detail, consisting of Oliver
Ellsworth, Nathaniel Gorham, Edmund Randolph, John Rutledge, and James Wilson. 36 The
Preamble in its final form is perhaps best attributed to the Committee of Style, consisting of

34
Similarly, the 1975 science-fiction novel Venus on the Half-Shell must be interpreted by reference to the imagined
intentions of the wholly fictional Kilgore Trout (a character invented by Kurt Vonnegut) rather than by Philip José
Farmer, the book’s literal author. If Farmer wanted his real intentions rather than Trout’s fictional ones to control, he
could have identified himself rather than Trout as the author.
35

Cf. RAYMOND W. GIBBS, JR., INTENTIONS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF MEANING 220 (1999) (“I might even purchase a
birthday card from a local store, present this to a friend, and claim authorship of the sentiments expressed in the card
simply because I signed and sent the card to a particular person, even if as ‘author’ I am not historically connected to
the person who wrote the text.”).
36

On the crucial role of the Committee of Detail in the drafting of the Constitution, see William Ewald, The
Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENTARY 197 (2012).
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Alexander Hamilton, William Johnson, Rufus King, James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris. 37
Perhaps one could more specifically link individual provisions, or even phrases, with particular
persons, such as attributing the Territory or Other Property Clause or the Preamble to Gouverneur
Morris. 38 But just as with a will or a form lease, the legal author of the Constitution is none of
those people who actually composed the words. The legal author is identified in the Preamble as
“We the People of the United States,” who ordained and established the document. That is the
author in whose name the document was issued. As we noted above, for interpretative purposes,
it makes no difference whether that claim of authorship is a preposterous pretension, a profound
insight about political theory, or neither.

For interpretative purposes – for purposes of

understanding to what things and relations in the world the words of the Constitution refer – the
claim is a brute fact. The document says that its author is “We the People of the United States.”
If you want to ascertain the communicative meaning of the document, you have to take that
claimed authorship as a starting point, without regard to its merit as a matter of political or moral
theory. Otherwise, you are inventing meaning rather than ascertaining it.
Importantly, that entity “We the People of the United States” is not necessarily just the
historically real and concrete people in the ratifying States who gave the Constitution full legal
effect in those States. Article VII provides: “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States,
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same.” 39 The legal effect of the Constitution thus depended on the actions of a specific group of

37

2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 553 (Max Farrand ed. 1911).

38
On Morris as the likely literal author of the Territory or Other Property Clause, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra
note 3, at 73. On Morris as the likely literal author of the Preamble, see PETER CHARLES HOFFER, FOR OURSELVES
AND OUR POSTERITY: THE PREAMBLE TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14 (2013).
39

U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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historically real people who participated in state ratifying conventions. That group necessarily
excluded inhabitants of federal territories who were not citizens of some specific State that was
part of the Constitution’s ratification process, because the territories, as territories, played no role
in constitutional ratification. Does that end this article’s inquiry into the constitutional status of
territorial inhabitants before it even begins?
Not at all. Take a step back from the Article VII ratification scheme and ask this more
basic question: What gave Article VII any relevance? The answer is that Article VII is only legally
relevant, as far as the Constitution is concerned, because the ordained and established Constitution
authored by “We the People of the United States” made it so. Here again it is important to
distinguish the task of interpreting the Constitution from the task of justifying it or any form of
government emerging in its name. As a matter of political theory, we express no view on whether
the action of state ratifying conventions in 1787-88 could, either with or without a draft of a
constitution in front of them, legitimately create a government. That is a question separate and
apart from ascertaining the legal authorship, and therefore the meaning, of the Constitution of
1788, and our only concern is with meaning. For interpretative purposes, the ratifiers are relevant
only because the instrument that they are ratifying makes them relevant by its terms. Those terms,
in turn, were authored by “We the People of the United States.” The Constitution is given formal
legal effect within certain States by ratifying conventions, but it is “ordained and established” as a
legal instrument by “We the People.” The exclusion of territorial inhabitants from Article VII
does not tell us the content of “We the People of the United States.”
Moreover, note that the Preamble speaks in the present tense: We the People “do ordain
and establish this Constitution.” The act of ordaining and establishing is complete by the end of
the Preamble’s one sentence. Nothing more than the Preamble itself is necessary for that act of
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ordaining and establishing. Article VII prescribes a separate act: the “Establishment” of the
Constitution among the ratifying States. The ratifiers gave full legal effect within their own States
to the Constitution, but the document itself existed prior to the ratification and had communicative
meaning prior to the ratification. “In 1788, the Constitution had the same meaning in Rhode Island
and North Carolina as it had in New Hampshire and Connecticut, and it would have had the same
meaning had it been defeated at five ratifying conventions.” 40 Indeed, the ratifiers were ratifying
“this Constitution,” which had identity and meaning apart from the ratification process. Similarly,
a will does not become fully effective until it goes through probate, but the probate judge is not
the legal author of the instrument, and one does not consult the judge’s intentions when
ascertaining the will’s meaning. Indeed, the judge strives to give effect to the intentions of the
decedent – the will’s legal author.

For the same reasons, for purposes of ascertaining

communicative meaning, the author of the Constitution is “We the People of the United States.”
The document says so. 41
Another feature of “We the People of the United States,” which has special relevance for
the role of territorial inhabitants, is that the document in question was a constitution “for the United
States of America.” The Constitution did not bring the United of America into existence. The
United States of America existed before the Constitution was ratified, and the “People of the
United States” as an entity capable of having legally constructed intentions similarly pre-dated the
Constitution. The identity of “the People of the United States” thus depends on pre-constitutional
understandings.

40
Gary Lawson, Classical Liberal Constitution or Classical Liberal Construction?, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 808,
821 n.50 (2014).
41

For a more detailed account of why and how “We the People” is the Constitution’s author, see Lawson & Seidman,
supra note 26, at 58-70.
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The pre-constitutional existence of the United States is textually clear from the Constitution
itself. Article IV gives Congress “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulation
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States,” 42 and then adds that
“nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States
. . . .” 43 This means that the Constitution assumes that “the United States” as an entity had claims
to territory or other property that pre-date the Constitution. Similarly, the Article VI Engagements
Clause provides that “[a]ll Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption
of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under
the Confederation.” 44 The “United States” that existed under the Articles of Confederation is thus
the same entity – the same “United States” – for whom the Constitution provides new powers and
responsibilities.

The Supremacy Clause similarly emphasizes continuity between the pre-

ratification and post-ratification “United States” by referencing “all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States.” 45
These cross-temporal references are not surprising, because the Constitution did not
immediately and fully displace the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution took effect in
stages, with some provisions, such as the Contracts Clause, 46 taking effect immediately upon
ratification on June 21, 1788, while other provisions, such as the Treaty Clause, 47 could not

42

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

43

Id.

44

Id. art. VI, cl. 1.

45

Id. art. VI, cl. 2.

46

See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts”).

47

See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties”).
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become effective until the machinery of the federal government, such as a President and Senate,
was in place, which did not fully happen until spring 1789. 48 The Constitution, unlike many of
the state constitutions of the time, did not contain an express provision regarding the transition
from the previous regime to the new one. The best inference from this silence is that certain
institutions from the Articles of Confederation, such as the treaty-making authority of the national
government, remained in force until the constitutional machinery to replace those institutions was
formed. 49 Thus, “[t]he United States of America” proclaimed in the Articles of Confederation 50
was in existence before the Constitution was ratified, and it maintained its identity through
ratification.
It is unclear at what moment in time “the United States” as an entity – and thus something
called “the People of the United States” -- came into existence. At the very latest, the United States
as a corporate entity51 – and therefore “the People of the United States” as a meaningful
concept -- existed as of March 1, 1781, when the Articles of Confederation were ratified. The
Articles on multiple occasions refer to the United States as an entity distinct from the constituent
States. 52 It is also possible that “the United States,” and therefore its “People,” existed before that
time, though the evidence is equivocal.

48

On the stages of constitutional effectiveness, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become
Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2001).

49

We make this argument at some length in Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First “Establishment” Clause:
Article VII and the Post-Constitutional Confederation, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 83 (2002).
50

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. I.

51

In the founding era, all governmental bodies were considered corporations. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419, 447 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“The word ‘corporations,’ in its largest sense, has a more extensive
meaning than people generally are aware of. Any body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be restricted or
transcendant, is in this sense ‘a corporation.’ ”).
52

See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. I, VI, IX.
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Counting against a pre-Articles of Confederation existence of the United States and its
“People” is the fact that if “the United States” was a distinct entity before March 1, 1781, it would
be fully capable of holding property, which is one of the inherent powers of corporations under
founding-era corporate law, 53 and it would therefore have made sense for land cessions from
individual States to be made to that entity. New York ceded its western land claims more than a
year before ratification of the Articles of Confederation, 54 but the cession very pointedly was not
made to “the United States” as an entity. Rather, the cession was made “for the use and benefit of
such of the United States, as shall become members of the federal alliance of the said states.”55
This was a grant to States as parties to a confederation rather than to a distinctive entity called “the
United States.” The Virginia cession of January 2, 1781, similarly read as a grant to “United States”
understood as a group of States rather than to a distinct corporate entity. 56
The senses of foreign actors, and of diplomats negotiating with foreign actors over treaty
language, does not necessarily say much about the issues that concern us, but for whatever it is
worth: The 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France was styled as an agreement among
“[t]he most Christian King, and the thirteen United States of North America, to wit, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay Rhode island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia North-Carolina, South Carolina & Georgia.” 57 That is an agreement

53

See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *463; John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of
Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063, 1082-83 (2015).

54

See Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. HISTORICAL REV. 27, 43 (1936) (noting that New
York ceded its lands on February 19, 1780).
55

19 J. CONT. CONG. 211 (1781).

56
See
Letter
from
Thomas
Jefferson
to
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-04-02-0481.
57

Samuel

Huntington,

Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 12.
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Jan.

17,

1781,

among fourteen distinct nation-states rather than an agreement between France and a unitary
corporate entity. Similarly, the contemporaneous Treaty of Alliance with France was formed
between France and individual States acting jointly rather than between France and a distinct entity
called “the United States.” 58 This at least suggests that there was no “United States” before 1781.
On the other hand, even after 1781, treaties did not typically refer to “the United States” as
a distinct entity. The same formulation from the 1778 treaties with France was used in 1782 for
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Dutch Republic 59 and the 1783 Treaty of Amity and
Commerce with Sweden. 60 The 1785 treaty with Prussia did not specifically list each of the States
as parties, but it did refer to “the United States of America, and their citizens,” 61 not to “the United
States of America, and its citizens.” None of these treaty provisions reads as though the United
States was a distinct entity, even after 1781, though it obviously was such an entity by that point.
Perhaps more tellingly, from an early date it was standard practice in those pre-Articles treaties to
refer to “two parties” 62 to the treaties, which understands the collective States to be a single entity.
Other formulations referred to “either party” 63 or, as in the post-Articles of Confederation
Moroccan-American Treaty of Peace and Friendship, “both parties.” 64 If the relevant entities were
the thirteen States acting as discrete nations, that reference would be inappropriate. But we do not
want to make too much of these formulations; it is obviously convenient for treaties to refer to the

58

See Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1778, 8 Stat. 6.

59

Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Neth., Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32.

60

Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Swed., Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60.

61

Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Prussia, July-Sept. 1785, 8 Stat. 84.

62

Treaty of Alliance, U.S.-Fr., art. XI, 8 Stat. 10; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., art. XV, 8 Stat. 22

63

Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Fr., arts. XII, XVII, XIX, 8 Stat. 20, 22.

64

Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Morocco, Jan. 1787, Art. I, 8 Stat. 100.
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assemblage of the collective States as a single entity without intending to make any profound
statements about the independent corporate status of something called “the United States.”
More relevantly, in Respublica v. Cornelius Sweers. 65 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
1779 clearly understood “the United States” to be a distinct entity at least two years before the
Articles of Confederation took effect. Sweers, a commissary clerk in the United States Army
during the Revolutionary War, was indicted, prosecuted, and convicted in Pennsylvania “for
altering a bill of parcels and receipt given by Margaret Duncan, for goods bought from her, with
intent to defraud the United States” 66 and “for forging a receipt, purporting to be a receipt from
one Adam Foulke, with intent to defraud the United States.” 67 Sweers’ defense was that there
could be no such offense of defrauding “the United States” because “ ‘at the time of the offence
charged, the United States were not a body corporate known in law.’ ” 68 There was, claimed
Sweers, simply no “United States” for him to defraud. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court tersely
held otherwise: “From the moment of their association, the United States necessarily became a
body corporate; for, there was no superior from whom that character could otherwise be derived.
IN ENGLAND,

THE KING, LORDS, AND COMMONS, ARE CERTAINLY A BODY CORPORATE; AND YET

THERE NEVER WAS

any charter or statute, by which they were expressly so created.” 69 It is not

entirely clear what the court had in mind as “the moment of their association.” Was that November
15, 1777, when the Articles of Confederation were sent to the States for ratification? July 1776

65

1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 41 (Pa. S. Ct. 1779).

66

Id. at 41.

67

Id. at 43.

68

Id. at 44.

69

Id.
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when the States jointly declared independence? Or was it even earlier, with the meeting of the
first Continental Congress in 1774, or even with the meeting of the Stamp Act Congress of 1765?
The court did not say, and for our purposes it does not matter very much which precise date the
court had in mind.

The United States certainly existed as an entity once the Articles of

Confederation took effect, which is why post-Articles treaties could refer to “the two nations”70
or, as in the Treaty of Paris, “the two countries.” 71

By early 1781, “the People of the United

States” thus existed as a legal entity capable of authoring documents and having legally
constructed intentions, just as any juridical entity such as a private corporation is capable of issuing
documents in its own name and having legally constructed intentions.

II

If before 1788 there was a “United States,” and thus a “People of the United States,” there
were also “Citizen[s]” of the United States during that time. Are those categories of “People” and
“Citizen[s]” co-extensive for purposes of understanding the Preamble?
It is possible, but we do not think so. In order to ascertain the meaning of “We the People
of the United States,” we do not think that we need to solve the riddle of the meaning of a “Citizen
of the United States” as of 1788. That is good news, because it is quite a nasty riddle.
The Constitution of 1788 uses the term “Citizen of the United States” solely in the context
of qualifications for the presidency or Congress. The Senate Qualifications Clause requires that

70

CONVENTION Between the Lords the States General of the United Netherlands, and the United States of America,
concerning Vessells re-captured, Oct. 8, 1782, art. I, 8 Stat. 50.

71

Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr.Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
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senators be United States citizens for at least nine years. Thus, in 1789 when a Senate was first
convened, there seemingly had to be something called “the United States” for people to be citizens
of at least since 1780, a year before the Articles of Confederation, or else no one would be qualified
to serve in the first Senate. Alternatively, of course, the term could mean a citizen of any one of
the United States, with such citizenship defined at the state level, rather than (or perhaps in addition
to) referring to United States citizenship as a distinct concept. (The Article II Qualifications Clause
avoids this temporal problem by saying that the President must be a citizen “at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution.”) The Constitution says nothing about any of these questions –
leading to Attorney General Bates’ previously quoted 1862 lament about the uncertain character
of United States citizenship 72 and a great deal of subsequent inconclusive scholarship.
The difficulties of sorting out the meaning and consequences of citizenship run deep. It is
not surprising that the founders chose to leave the matter unaddressed. Societies had been
wrestling with the multiple meanings and consequences of citizenship at least since classical
times 73 – and the founding generation was well versed in classical studies 74 and the basic fact that
“there are still many aspects of ancient citizenship that lay in the shadows.” 75 Part of the problem
is linguistic. The term “citizen” can mean many things. Some of those meanings are technical
and legal, while others are more colloquial or cultural. As a professor of English has aptly said:

72

See supra --.

73

See JOSINE BLOK, CITIZENSHIP IN CLASSICAL ATHENS (2017); PHILIP BROOK MANVILLE, THE ORIGIN OF
CITIZENSHIP IN ANCIENT ATHENS (1990); A.N. SHERMAN-WHITE, THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP 2d ed., 1973); J.G.A.
Pocock, The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times, 99 QUEEN’S QUAR. 33 (1992).
74

See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: PREVAILING WISDOM
(2008); CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT
(1994).
75

Lucia Cecchet, Citizenship in the Greek World: Varieties of Organisations, Communities, and Civic Bodies, in
CITIZENS IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD: ASPECTS OF CITIZENSHIP FROM THE ARCHAIC PERIOD TO AD 212, at( 1,1
(Lucia Ceccet & Anna Busetto eds., 2017).
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“In the early United States, citizenship was less a legal category than an emergent extralegal
concept that accumulated its meaning flexibly in rhetorical experiments that traversed several
genres.” 76 Part of the problem is substantive. How one defines a citizen depends largely on the
consequences of that definition. What does one get – and what does one owe – by virtue of being
a citizen rather than an alien? And part of the problem is political and structural. In the United
States, there are two distinct citizenships: state and national. Often they go together, but sometimes
they do not. The concept of dual citizenship is at least as old as Roman times, but it introduces
complications that a careful study of citizenship must address. All of these concerns sharply pose
risks of equivocation: Uses of the term “citizen” in one context may mean something quite
different in other contexts, or even in different premises of a single argument.
We hope to avoid all of these problems with defining citizenship. The brute fact is thar the
Preamble that we are seeking to interpret does not ever use the word “Citizen.” It uses the word
“People” – in sharp distinction to the specific uses of the word “Citizen” in the various qualification
clauses. It is certainly possible to have a conception of “the People” that includes only citizens,
but that is hardly inevitable, especially if “citizen” takes on a technical legal meaning rather than
a broad colloquial one. Thus, we confine our efforts to trying to define “We the People of the
United States,” without presupposing that this category is or is not equivalent to some conception
of “Citizens of the United States.”
There was clearly something called “the United States “before the Constitution. And if
there was a United States, there was a “People of the United States.” The real question is thus not
whether “We the People of the United States” was a kind of juridical entity akin to a corporation
in 1788. Of course it was. The real question is: Who were the equivalents of its shareholders?

76

CARRIE HYDE, CIVIL LONGING: THE SPECULATIVE ORIGINS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP 9 (2018).
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More specifically, what precisely was the extent of this “United States” whose “People” were
purporting to speak in the Preamble about ordaining and establishing a new constitution?
As we have noted, one of the legal characteristics of a corporation is the capacity to hold
land in its own name.

“By March, 1781, Congress was in possession of the New York,

Connecticut, and Virginia cessions,” 77 making the United States prior to the Constitution a
substantial landowner. The terms of the cessions effectuated before the Articles of Confederation,
we have noted, did not purport to grant land the United States as an entity, 78 but by 1781 it was
clear that the United States was a distinct entity holding territory. What was the status of that
federally owned and governed territory – and, more specifically, what was the status of the
inhabitants of that federally owned and governed territory between 1781 and 1788?
We get some clues – though characteristically equivocal ones for this topic -- from the
manner of federal governance of territory under the Articles of Confederation. To be sure, it was
not at all clear from where the Confederation Congress even got the power to govern territory and
its inhabitants. Article XIX of John Dickinson’s early draft of proposed articles of confederation
contained a grant to Congress of power to govern federal territory, 79 but no such provision appears
in the actual Articles of Confederation. This absence has not gone unnoticed over the years, 80 but
no serious objections to lack of power were raised in the founding era. 81 Consequently, from an

77

Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 26 MISS. VALLEY HISTORICAL REV. 323, 323 (1939).

78

See supra --.

79

See Josiah Bartlett’s and John Dickinson’s Draft Articles of Confederation, IN 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS , 1774-1789, AT 243 (PAUL H. SMITH ED. 1979).
80

See Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 940 n.77
(1995).

81

See JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 73 (2002).

25

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3932611

CONSTITUTIONALISM

early date following the state cessions of territory, the Congress under the Article of Confederation
exercised power to govern the Northwest Territory, as the ceded land is typically called.
The first such statute in 1784 gave broad powers to territorial inhabitants to govern
themselves:
[T]he settlers on any territory so purchased, and offered for sale, shall either on
their own petition or on the order of Congress, receive authority . . . to meet together
for the purpose of establishing a temporary government, to adopt the constitution
and laws of any one of the original States; so that such laws nevertheless shall be
subject to alteration by their ordinary legislature; and to erect, subject to a like
alteration, counties, townships, or other divisions, for the election of members for
their legislature.
. . . [W]hen any such State shall have acquired twenty thousand free
inhabitants . . . , they shall receive . . . authority . . . to call a convention of
representatives to establish a permanent constitution and government for
themselves. 82
There were provisos involving the kinds of governments that could be created in the territory,
including a proviso forbidding taxes on federal land, 83 but on the whole the thrust of this statute
was to treat the inhabitants of territories as a self-governing body. The federal presence was
limited to a vague provision declaring “[t]hat measures not inconsistent with the principles of the
Confederation, and necessary for the preservation of peace and good order among the settlers in
any of the said new states, until they shall assume a temporary government as aforesaid, may, from

82

26 J. CONT. CONG. 276 (1784).

83

See id. at 277.
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time to time, be taken by the United States in Congress assembled.” 84 The statute assumed that
these self-governing “State[s],” as the statute called them, would in time be admitted to the
Confederation “on an equal footing with the said original states.” 85
For reasons detailed by Peter Onuf in his indispensable study of the Northwest
Ordinance, 86 this Jeffersonian/Republican vision of territorial self-governance ran into the reality
of the need for law, order, and clear property titles in order to attract adequate numbers of highquality settlers to the region. Accordingly, the Confederation Congress in 1787 replaced this thin
scheme with an “Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States, North West
of the river Ohio,” 87 popularly known as the Northwest Ordinance. This statute provided for more
robust federal supervision of the territory, but it still left considerable room for internal selfgovernance. Unsurprisingly, it sends mixed messages about the status of territorial inhabitants.
On the one hand, the residents of the territory were referred to as “inhabitants” 88 rather
than citizens, either of the United States (whatever that would have meant at the time) or of any
State. Indeed, the assumption was that at least some residents would have no state citizenship;
qualification for service in the territorial legislature required that one “shall have been a citizen of
one of the United States at least three years and be a resident in the district or . . . shall have resided
in the district three years . . . .” 89

84

Id. at 278.

85

Id.

86

See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1992).

87

32 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 334 (1787).

88

See id. at 337, 340-43.

89

Id. at 339. There was also a modest property qualification. See id.
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On the other hand, the provisions for internal territorial governance through local
legislatures, though more limited than the provisions in 1784, say much about how the territories
and their inhabitants were viewed in the pre-constitutional period. Even though many influential
state and national figures viewed the territorial settlers as less civilized than their state counterparts
and of dubious character for self-governance, 90 the Northwest Ordinance continued to provide for
local legislatures elected by local inhabitants and retained the promise of statehood as soon as
specific population levels were reached. The ordinance stated that “there shall be formed, in said
territory, not less than three nor more than five States” 91 and guaranteed those States admission to
the Union when their population reached sixty thousand. 92 Indeed, that commitment to turning
territorial inhabitants into state inhabitants was put in place even before the land cessions took
place:
Before there was a Northwest Territory, its political future had been
prescribed. In the Public Lands Resolution of 10 October 1780, the Congress had
resolved (1) that the lands ceded to the United States “shall be settled and formed
into distinct . . . states, which shall become members of the Federal Union, and shall
have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence as the other States,”
and (2) that they shall be “republican states.” 93

90

See Duffey, supra note 80, at 936; Robert S. Hill, Federalism, Republicanism, and the Northwest Ordinance, 18
PUBLIUS 41, 43 (1988). Those doubts were not entirely unjustified. See ONUF, supra note 86, at xxiii (“Speculators,
squatters, and other adventurers infested the new settlements, promoting their private interests, defying state and
national authority, and entertaining overtures from foreign powers”).
91

Northwest Ordinance, Article the Fifth, 32 J. CONT. CONGRESS at 343.

92

See id..

93

Hill, supra note 90, at 43.
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Even though the path to statehood looked longer and more complicated in 1788 than it did in 1780
or 1784, 94 territorial status was always, in the founding era, considered a way station on the path
to statehood. As Peter Onuf put it: “Statehood was immanent in the concept of territory.” 95 If
territorial inhabitants were not yet fully citizens of the United States (again putting aside what that
might have meant in the 1780s), they were national citizens in the making. They were guaranteed
basic rights of citizens, such as trial by jury, 96 just compensation for takings of property, 97 and the
sanctity of private contracts, 98 and they were expected to fulfill basic duties of citizens, such as “to
pay a part of the federal debts contracted or to be contracted, and a proportional part of the expenses
of Government.” 99 With rights came duties for territorial inhabitants, just as with citizenship
within a State.
On the other, other hand (and the reader may have noticed that there are almost always
several hands with regard to these matters), the Northwest Territory was not even remotely wholly
self-governing. It had a federally appointed governor, secretary, and judges. 100 As Gregory
Ablavsky has pointed out, the governance of the Northwest Territory had many features of a
federal administrative agency. 101 Inhabitants of the territory were not nearly on a par with
inhabitants in the States.

94

See ONUF, supra note 86, at 54-55, 59-60, 72.

95

Id.at xxx.

96

See ;J. CONT. CONG. at 340.

97

See id.

98

See id.

99

Id. at 341. There was a similar proviso in the 1784 ordinance. See 26 J. CONT. CONG. 277.

100

See 32 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. at 335-36.

101

See Ablavsky, supra note 26.
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Depending on whether one sees the glass as half-empty or half-full, one could plausibly
say either that territorial inhabitants were very close to or very far from being full members of the
political community of the United States known as “We the People.” But in the end, here are the
simplest of questions that we think bear most directly on the narrow interpretative question before
us: When the 1782 treaty with the Netherlands said that there would be “a firm, inviolable and
universal peace and sincere friendship . . . between the subjects and inhabitants of the said parties,
and between the countries, islands, cities and places, situated under the jurisdiction of the said
United Netherlands, and the said United States of America, their subjects and inhabitants, of every
degree, without exception of persons or places,” 102 could that possibly have meant only persons
within the jurisdiction of some specific State? Of course not. If the United States went to war,
would the opponent regard the people in the territories as enemy combatants? Of course. When
the United States acted as a corporate entity, it acted on behalf of all of the people subject to its
jurisdiction, including those in the territories without state citizenship.
It was certainly possible in 1788 to use the term “the United States” to refer solely to an
assemblage of the thirteen States. But the most basic, default understanding of that term would
include the territory that was not under the jurisdiction of any specific State but belonged to the
United States as a corporate entity. That was true in 1820, and it was true in 1788. Thus, the
people of “the United States,” presumptively understood in this fashion, would at least
presumptively include people in federal territory.
Presumptions, of course, are generally rebuttable.

Does anything in or about the

Constitution rebut this one?

102

Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Neth., art. I, 8 Stat. 32.
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III

We can now begin to address our central question: Were territorial inhabitants among the
“We the People of the United States” who legally authored the Constitution?
The strongest argument against including them as part of “We the People of the United
States” comes from the Constitution itself. While the Articles of Confederation neglected to give
Congress explicit power to govern territory, the Constitution contained two clauses specifically
addressed to that topic. The Territories Clause -- or, as we would call it, the Territory or Other
Property Clause -- provides: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States
. . . .” 103 A similar clause gives Congress power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever” 104 over the District of Columbia.105 Several features of the Territory or Other
Property Clause suggest that territories are constitutionally distinct from the United States.
First, and most obviously, the clause describes federal territory as “belonging to the United
States.” It seems clear that “belonging” in this context describes an ownership relationship rather
than an inclusive one. The clause is not saying that federal territories “belong[]” to the United
States in the Loughborough v. Blake sense of being part of the political unit but instead is saying
that they “belong[]” to the United States as property belongs to its owner. They are therefore, in
a constitutional sense, something different and apart from “the United States” that owns them.

103

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

104

Id art. I, § 8, cl. 17.

105

We do not explore here how similar or dissimilar these two provisions might be. For a discussion of possible
differences between the Territory and Other Property Clause and the District Clause, see James Durling, The District
of Columbia and Article III, 107 GEO. L.J. 1205 (2019).
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That meaning is confirmed by the fact that territory is conjoined in the clause with “other
Property.” As far as the Constitution is concerned, federal territory is equivalent to staplers or
paper clips owned by the federal government; the clause does not distinguish Congress’s power
over the former from its power over the latter. This is not a formulation designed to communicate
clearly that territorial inhabitants are on a par with state inhabitants or are fully included within the
political compass of “the United States.”
Second, for those who care about such things (and we generally do not), the principal
drafter of the Territory or other Property Clause, Gouverneur Morris, deliberately crafted the
clause in order to put federal territory into a dependent status. As Morris forthrightly admitted in
an 1803 letter:
I always thought that when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana, it
would be proper to govern them as provinces and allow them no voice in our
councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as far as
circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add
my belief, that had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would
have been made. 106
The textual equation of territory with paper clips was not an accidental drafting error.
Third, the Territory or Other Property Clause includes a seemingly unlimited right on the
part of Congress to “dispose of” federal territory. This is a natural and expected aspect of the
provision, as a principal purpose of ceding land to the national government was to allow it to sell
(“dispose of”) that land in order to pay national debts incurred during the Revolutionary War. But

106

Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 THE LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS,
192 (Jared Sparks ed., 1832).

WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS

32

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3932611

the breadth of the clause would seem to allow Congress to transfer that land, whether or not it is
occupied, wholesale to a foreign power, with or without consideration. The effect of such a
transfer would be to impose on inhabitants of that transferred territory allegiance to the formerly
foreign power that would now own the territory. If any such power exists to effect that kind of
transfer of allegiance for inhabitants of a State, it can only come from the treaty power, and any
such treaty would require the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. 107 Moreover, if our view of the
federal treaty power – set out at length in other work 108 – is correct, state territory could only be
transferred to a foreign power as part of a treaty of peace, not for ordinary commercial purposes. 109
None of that is true with regard to disposal of non-state territory; the Constitution seems to permit
a reverse-Louisiana Purchase – a Louisiana Sale – if Congress deems it appropriate. The relative
freedom afforded Congress in the disposal of territory – and the inhabitants thereof -- suggests that
federal territorial inhabitants are simply not part of “the People of the United States” in the same
sense as state inhabitants.
Finally, the Guarantee Clause requires every State to have “a Republican Form of
Government." 110 There is no express constitutional requirement that Congress establish republican
institutions in territories. 111

107

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Of course, it would not require consent from the House. Whether it is easier to
get agreement from majorities of both houses of Congress or from a two-thirds majority of the Senate is an empirical
question that changes from time to time and from issue to issue. Precisely that question drove much of the debate
over the annexation of Texas. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 92.

108

See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006).

109

See id. at 62-64.

110

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

111

There is also no express definition in the Constitution of what constitutes a “Republican Form of Government.”
Extra-constitutional sources are not materially more helpful. See CALABRESI & LAWSON, supra note --, at 77-78.
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The Preamble itself also contains suggestions that territorial inhabitants are not part of “We
the People.” One of the purposes of the Constitution was “to form a more perfect Union.” 112 As
Akhil Amar points out, this language was “openly patterned on the indissoluble 1707 union of
Scotland and England, as Federalists emphasized at every turn, in many states, in both speech and
print, from the beginning to the end of the ratification process.” 113 Scotland and England were
independent nations that chose to merge into a single political unit. The States could make that
same choice in 1788, but an owned territory that was not at the time an independent nation-state
could not – which explains why States but not the Northwest Territory were part of the Article VII
ratification process. It makes sense to speak of a “Union” of formerly independent nation-states;
it is hard to see how this language applies to territory that is owned rather than independent.
These are powerful arguments. Now we consider the other side.
The countervailing case in favor of including territorial inhabitants in “We the People of
the United States” also begins with the constitutional text – in this case the text of the Preamble.
The Constitution does not say that it was ordained and established by “We the Citizens of the
United States.” It does not describe its author as “We the Citizens of the various States.” It does
not say “We the Ratifiers of the Constitution.”

It does not even use the phrase “We the People

of the States” – which is precisely the language that was used in the first draft of the provision.
The preamble that emerged from the Committee of Detail, and that at one point received the
approval of the Constitutional Convention, read: “We the people of the States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey,

112

U.S. CONST. Preamble.

113

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE WORDS THAT MADE US: AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATION, 1760-1840, at
263 (2021).
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Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do
ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our
Posterity.” 114 This version clearly excludes territorial inhabitants from the “People” authoring the
Constitution; only people in the States counted. The final version of the Preamble produced by
the Committee of Style uses the broader term – indeed, perhaps the broadest term that one could
use – “We the People of the United States.” If the presumptive meaning of “the United States”
includes territories, the presumptive meaning of this provision would also include territorial
inhabitants. If the document meant to refer to a narrower, specific sub-group of people, it would
have been very easy to do so.
There is really no way to tell whether this substitution of language by the Committee of
Style was deliberately attempting to broaden the specification of the Constitution’s authorship.
Even if we cared what the drafters of this language subjectively thought (and we mostly do not),
we have precious little information about how the precise wording of the Preamble came about.
No one on the Committee of Style took notes. Accordingly, “historians have very little evidence
of what went on in the meetings of the Committee of Style.” 115 Nor was there relevant discussion
of the meaning of “We the People of the United States” at the Constitutional Convention or during
ratification. All we have is the text, and the text seems to sweep quite broadly.
The next phase of the case for including territorial inhabitants in “We the People” is a bit
subtler but perhaps even more powerful. The author “We the People of the United States” purports
to be ordaining and establishing a constitution. Again, it does not matter for interpretative purposes
whether this makes even the slightest bit of sense as a matter of normative political theory. It is

114

2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 177 (Max Farrand ed. 1911).

115

HOFFER, supra note --, at 66.
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what the document says it is about, so, for purposes of understanding the document, one must take
that as a given. The natural inference is that this author “We the People of the United States”
thinks itself subject to the jurisdiction of the entity that it is creating. More to the point, “We the
People of the United States” is the entity empowering the institutions of government mentioned in
the instrument, with the goal of having those institutions manage some portion of the affairs of
“We the People of the United States.” The scope of power exercised by those institutions extends
over the entire geographic and political range of the United States in its broadest sense, including
federally owned territory. Congress is given power to make rules and regulations respecting
territory. 116 The President’s “executive Power” 117 includes the power to execute federal law within
territories. The power of federal courts to decide cases “arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority” 118 includes
cases involving territories. “We the People of the United States” could not possibly think that it
was empowering institutions to govern, let us say, French or Spanish inhabitants, because there
would be a spectacular mismatch between the empowering and empowered entities. To match up
the powers with the empowering requires including territorial inhabitants among the empowering.
This understanding of “We the People of the United States” connects the wording of the
Preamble to the wording of the Declaration of Independence a decade earlier. One of the most
famous of the self-evident truths announced by the Declaration is that to secure rights,
“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the
Governed.” 119 Since territorial inhabitants are among the people governed by the Constitution,

116

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

117

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

118

Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

119

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (1776).
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their consent is essential to the structure. Since consent in this context is figurative rather than
literal, a reasonable accommodation of the need for the consent of the governed with the realities
of formation of a government is to include territorial inhabitants among the beneficiaries of the
instrument by reading the term “People” to encompass them.
To be sure, one must not make more of this argument than it will bear. A strong form of
this argument makes assumptions about the eighteenth-century perception of representation and
its relationship to political authority that are the stuff of felled forests. We are not historians,
political scientists, or political or moral theorists, and we have no desire to inject ourselves into
those debates. We simply offer, as a matter of legal interpretation, the observation that the
Constitution makes the most sense as a fiduciary instrument if the empowering principal is a good
fit with the powers granted to the various agents. Since those powers include authority over
territorial affairs, the Constitution makes more sense as a fiduciary instrument if one has a broader
rather than narrower conception of “We the People of the United States” that includes all of the
people subject to the jurisdiction of the government, even if they are not subject to the jurisdiction
of any specific State.
If all we had to go on were the arguments just canvassed, the weight of argument would
probably lean against including territorial inhabitants among “We the People.” The textual
arguments against inclusion are straightforward, and the counter-arguments are more equivocal.
It seems unlikely that the Committee of Style was making fundamental changes to the draft of the
Preamble that expressly excluded territorial inhabitants, and the argument from a structural
matching of the Constitution’s author with the Constitution’s governed has a question-begging
quality to it. The arguments for including territorial inhabitants, to be sure, are not meritless. Far
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from it; they are very substantial. But if the interpretative enterprise consists solely of weighing
the strengths of the combined arguments on each side, our sense is that the case against inclusion
is somewhat stronger than the case for it.
The interpretative question, however, is a bit subtler than this simple comparison of
arguments suggests. It might make a big difference how much the weight of argument leans in
one or the other direction.
We began this section with a presumption in favor of treating “the United States” as
including territories, which readily leads to a presumption in favor of treating “People of the United
States” as including people in the territories. We think that presumption is warranted in light of
the circumstances leading up to 1788 and the likely default understanding of a term such as “the
United States.”. How strong is that presumption, and are the arguments presented in this section
strong enough to overcome it?
Our definitive answer is that we do not know – and we doubt whether anyone else does
either. There is no objective metric for measuring the strength of a presumption or the weight of
evidence used to rebut it. Perhaps all that a presumption does in this context is provide a default
result in the absence of any evidence in either direction. If the prima facie case for inclusion of
territorial inhabitants in “We the People of the United States” takes this Thayerian form 120 of “[a]
presumption that allows the party against whom the presumption operates to come forward with
evidence to rebut the presumption, but that does not shift the burden of proof to that party,” 121 the

120

This account of presumptions as a decision tool in the absence of evidence received its classic expression in JAMES
B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 31-44 (1898), and has been largely codified in the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 301 (“In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party
against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule
does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.”). State law practice is
much more varied.
121

Thayer Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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textual and structural case against inclusion surely counts as non-zero evidence sufficient to
remove that presumption from play. On the other hand, there is another kind of Thayerian
presumption that leads to very different results.

If we are talking about a presumption akin to

Thayer’s rule of clear mistake for constitutional review of federal action, in which courts
“disregard the [federal] Act [only] when those who have the right to make laws have not merely
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, -- so clear that it is not open to rational
question,” 122 the case against inclusion of territorial inhabitants would need to establish its claim
beyond a reasonable doubt. Whatever that familiar but elusive term “beyond a reasonable doubt”
might mean, the case for excluding territorial inhabitants from “We the People of the United
States” does not remotely approach it. If that is the relevant presumption, it has not been, and
probably cannot be, overcome. In between these two Thayerian poles, of course, is an infinite
variety of gradations of the strength of a presumption. Where one locates the relevant presumption
and how one ascertains the strength of the evidence against it are matters that do not lend
themselves to clear answers.
A full exploration of these matters would take us down several rabbit holes involving
epistemology, cognitive theory, and evidence law and theory, among other rabbit holes, and that
is far afield from this project. 123 The best we can do at this point is to say that there are good-faith
arguments to be made on both sides for including or excluding territorial inhabitants from among
“We the People of the United States.” Reasonable people of good will could take and defend either
position as a matter of interpretative theory.

122

James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV.
129, 144 (1893).
123

For those who find the rabbit holes tempting, see GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS
(2017).
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As a matter of ascertaining communicative meaning, we do not think that the answer
depends much on the consequences of choosing one or the other interpretation.

But the

consequences of viewing territorial inhabitants among “We the People of the United States” are
worth noting. Accordingly, we conclude with two questions: (1) If, hypothetically, territorial
inhabitants are among the “People of the United States,” what does that mean for agents of federal
governance? (2) If, hypothetically, “the People of the United States” in 1788 included territorial
inhabitants, would that include people in after-acquired territories such as Puerto Rico or American
Samoa?

IV

Building on the pioneering work of Robert G. Natelson, we have argued at great length
elsewhere that the Constitution is a kind of fiduciary instrument, in which a principal – “We the
People of the United States” – grants to various agents – Congress, the President, and the federal
courts, among others -- some measure of authority over and responsibility for We the People’s
affairs. 124

We will not repeat here the book-length case for this characterization of the

Constitution. Suffice it for now to say that preambles that explain the purposes of power-granting
instruments were not uncommon in fiduciary instruments of the founding era. Those preambles
give guidance on how the agents are supposed to perform their discretionary functions -- cabined
always by, first and foremost, the express terms of the fiduciary instrument and, secondly and

124

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 15; Lawson & Seidman, An Enquiry Concerning Constitutional
Understanding, supra note 15. For the seminal works by Rob Natelson (who we only half-jokingly call our
“unindicted co-author”), see Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077
(2004); Robert G. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the Reign of Trajan, 35
U. RICHMOND L. REV. 191 (2001).
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crucially, the background norms of fiduciary law 125 that constitute the default rules that govern the
actions of agents in the absence of express directives to the contrary in the fiduciary instruments.
The specific preamble at issue here contains a number of goals or purposes for the agents
to pursue, including most notably “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity.” The “ourselves” is a direct reference to the author who ordained and established the
Constitution: “We the People of the United States.” Faithful agents who receive power under this
instrument would understand that their tasks include providing the blessings of liberty to “the
People of the United States” and its “Posterity.”
The trick is how to operationalize that fiduciary obligation in the real world, given the
fictitious character of “We the People” (not to mention its “Posterity”). That is a task for another
life, but fortunately two simple points are sufficient to settle the broad question of federal
obligations towards territories and their inhabitants.
First, all provisions in the Constitution, including the provisions giving Congress power
over federal territory and the District of Columbia, giving the President “executive Power” in those
territories, and giving federal courts the power and duty to decide cases involving those territories
that arise under federal law, come packaged with fiduciary duties. Those duties do not need to be

125

A recent article by Professors Sam Bray and Paul Miller questions whether there was anything that can be called
“fiduciary law” in the founding era. See Samuel L. Bray and Paul B. Miller, Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism,
106 VA. L. REV. 1479 (2020). They are right in this respect: The general category of fiduciary law, or fiduciary
instruments, did not really exist until substantially after the founding. In the founding era, there was a law of factors,
a law of guardians, a law of powers of appointment, a law of stewards, and so forth, but there was no overarching
framework that eighteenth-century lawyers would have seen as uniting all of these topics. But Professors Bray and
Miller are wrong, we think, in another important respect. There was no vocabulary of general fiduciary law in the
late eighteenth century, but there was a substance of such law. The category of fiduciary law emerged later because
there was law for the category to describe; the commonalities were there even if they were not always expressly
recognized. Robert Natelson has exhaustively catalogued the core features of eighteenth-century fiduciary law in this
retrospective sense. See Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in GARY
LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND
PROPER CLAUSE 57-59 (2010); and Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General
Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1239 (2007).
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expressly set out in the instrument, just as they would not need to be set out expressly in any
instrument engaging a steward, a factor, a guardian, or any other fiduciary agent. To be sure, the
instrument would need to identify and define those fiduciary duties if it wanted to deviate in any
fashion from the common-law baseline of duties that functions as the default rules for any fiduciary
instrument, but silence brings the default rules into play. Those default rules, as they stood in the
late eighteenth century, were aptly summarized by the indispensable Rob Natelson:
A.

The Duty to Follow Instructions and Remain Within Authority

Fiduciaries were required to honor the rules creating their power and,
therefore, had an absolute obligation to remain within their authority. If a fiduciary
did not act within his power, it was irrelevant whether or not he acted reasonably.
....
B.

The Duties of Loyalty and Good Faith

Fiduciaries were to represent their beneficiaries honestly and with
undivided loyalty and not act in a way prejudicial to them. Self-dealing was a
breach of trust.
C.

The Duty of Care

Fiduciaries were not insurers of everything that might go wrong under their
administration, that is, for “meer [sic] accident” or for cases in which the
beneficiary was at fault. There was, nonetheless, a basic duty of care or diligence
....
D.

The Duty to Exercise Personal Discretion

When not authorized in the instrument creating the relationship, fiduciary
duties were nondelegable . . . .
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E.

The Duty to Account

Fiduciaries, then and now, were expected to account to those for whom they
worked . . . .
F.

The Duty of Impartiality

In absence of a specific rule to the contrary (such as the rule permitting a
creditor-executor to pay himself before he paid other creditors), the common law
courts favored impartiality among members of the same class. The bias of the High
Court of Chancery – the source of most fiduciary law – toward impartiality was
even stronger. 126
There is nothing in the Constitution that fundamentally alters these basic fiduciary duties for
federal actors. Indeed, there is much in the Constitution that confirms, clarifies, or strengthens
them, including specific provisions detailing the duty to account, 127 the duty of loyalty, 128 and the
duty to stay within the limits of granted authority. 129
The duty that is perhaps most pertinent to territorial affairs is the duty of impartiality.
Where an agent represents multiple principals, the baseline eighteenth-century common-law rule
was that the agent must consider the interests of all of the principals. We have elsewhere explored
and developed that baseline rule at considerable length. 130 It does not require all principals to be

126

Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, supra note 124, at 57-59 (footnotes omitted).

127

See U.S. CONST. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time”).
128

See id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 10; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 6.

129

See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. IV, cl. 3.

130

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 15, at 151-71. That chapter, as with most of our work on fiduciary
constitutionalism, could not have existed without Rob Natelson. See Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G.
Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014).
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treated equally (which would be impossible in many contexts), but it does require them to be
treated fairly. As a noted fiduciary expert aptly put it: “[W]here a fiduciary serves classes of
beneficiaries as a whole, the fiduciary is nonetheless required to act fairly as between different
classes of beneficiary in taking decisions which affect the rights and interests of the classes inter
se.” 131 Pre-founding and founding-era caselaw amply reflects this understanding. 132 Those cases
treated equality among principals as a baseline norm, 133 but allowed deviations from that norm
when there were good reasons to treat different members of the beneficiary class differently -- as,
for example, when one beneficiary of an estate had received substantial sums from the testator
before death. 134
In the context of territorial governance, this means that territorial inhabitants must be
treated fairly, though not necessarily identically with non-territorial inhabitants. It would require
a separate article (which we are contemplating) to try to sort through the various contexts in which
this principle might arise and be resolved in practice. In particular, one would need an account of
what constitutes good reasons for different treatment of territorial and non-territorial inhabitants –
just as one needs an account of what constitutes good reasons for differential treatment of
beneficiaries of an estate when the holder of a power of appointment has discretionary but not
limitless power to dispose of assets. As with many questions of public constitutional law, the

131

Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 131, 138 (Malcolm
Cope ed., 1995).

132

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 15, at 157-63.

133

See, e.g., Gibson v. Kinven, 23 Eng. Rep. 315 (1682).

134

See Burrell v. Burrell, 27 Eng. Rep. 428 (1768).
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answer may lie in a careful study of pre-constitutional private law, 135 which had much experience
dealing with similar problems of agency in a world of multiple principals with competing interests.
Second, the best understanding of “Posterity,” as that term is used in the Preamble, extends
into the future to include inhabitants of territories not yet acquired in 1788. Of course, the literal
definition of “posterity” would be “succeeding generations; descendants.” 136

But a literal

definition in the context of the Preamble makes no sense and is pragmatically unwarranted. The
term “posterity,” and its connection to constitutional preambles, did not spring full blown from the
Committee of Style. The Constitution’s Preamble draws on a multiplicity of similar provisions in
earlier state constitutions and other documents that also mention “posterity”:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by
any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety. 137
[I]t is our indispensable duty to establish such original principles of
government, as will best promote the general happiness of the people of this State,
and their posterity, and provide for future improvements, without partiality for, or

135

See Lawson & Seidman, An Enquiry Concerning Constitutional Understanding, supra note 15, at 515-20. For
an example of how this application of private-law fiduciary principles can apply to specific constitutional problems,
see Gary Lawson, A Private-Law Solution to the Public-Law Puzzle of Subdelegation, in WHAT’S THE TEST? A NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Peter J. Wallison & John Yoo eds., 2022) (forthcoming).
136

SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).

137

VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776) (emphasis added), https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/virginiadeclaration-of-rights.
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prejudice against any particular class, sect, or denomination of men whatever
. . . . 138
We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts, acknowledging, with grateful
hearts, the goodness of the great Legislator of the universe, in affording us, in the
course of His providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without
fraud, violence or surprise, of entering into an original, explicit, and solemn
compact with each other; and of forming a new constitution of civil government,
for ourselves and posterity; and devoutly imploring His direction in so interesting
a design, do agree upon, ordain and establish the following Declaration of Rights,
and Frame of Government, as the CONSTITUTION

OF THE

COMMONWEALTH

OF

MASSACHUSETTS. 139
These provisions obviously do not limit their scope to then-existing inhabitants and their biological
progeny. These States all expected and welcomed new immigrants who were not literally the
“posterity” of the inhabitants at a specific instant in time. “Posterity” in these contexts thus refers
to all people who will come within the jurisdiction of the State in a condition legally equivalent to
those who are already present; “posterity” has a broad and metaphorical meaning rather than an
hereditarily literal one.
The Preamble’s reference to “Posterity” also obviously includes future persons biologically
unrelated to existing inhabitants. The Constitution provides for “Naturalization,” 140 and it was

138

PA. CONST. OF 1776, Preamble (emphasis added), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp. See also
VT. CONST. OF 1786 Preamble ¶ 18 (employing identical language),
https://sos.vermont.gov/vsara/learn/constitution/1786-constitution/.
139

MA. CONST. OF 1780 Preamble (first emphasis added), https://malegislature.gov/laws/constitution.

140

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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widely understood in 1788 that the United States was going to expand.

The Articles of

Confederation provided for automatic admission of Canada if it wanted to join the Union. 141 The
Constitution allows Congress to admit new States, 142 and there is no plausible case for limiting
that admission power only to territory then held by the United States. 143 Nor was it universally
understood that all expansion would occur on continental North America; Thomas Jefferson, at
least, regarded Cuba “as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of
States.” 144 If one looks only at the Constitution of 1788 and not at the politics and ideology of
1898, it is hard to see how future territories stand in any different position from territories that
existed in 1788.
If territorial inhabitants in 1788 were among “We the People of the United States,”
territorial inhabitants in 2021 – wherever on the globe those territories are located -- are pretty
clearly among the “Posterity” to whom the Preamble refers. Whatever fiduciary obligations
federal actors owed to territorial inhabitants in 1788 also apply in 2021.

141

See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI (“Canada, acceding to this confederation, and joining in the measures
of the united states, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this union; but no other colony shall
be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine states.”).
142

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union”).

143

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 3, at 73-78.
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Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Oct. 24, 1823, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 477,
479 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
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